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Abstract Diaspora politics has been celebrated as a form of transnationalism that 
can potentially challenge authoritarian regimes. Arguably, opposition groups and 
political activists can mobilize beyond the territorial limits of the state, thus bypassing 
some of the constraints to political organization found in authoritarian states. The 
literature on transnational and extraterritorial repression complicates this model, for 
it shows that states can use strategies of ‘long-distance authoritarianism’ to monitor, 
intimidate and harass diasporic populations abroad. Yet, non-state actors in the 
diaspora also sometimes use such repressive strategies to mobilize internally, gain 
hegemony within the diaspora, and marginalize or eliminate internal rivals. This 
raises the question of whether such activities can be understood as non-state forms of 
authoritarianism. Cases of diasporic politics pertaining to Turkey and Sri Lanka are 
briefly explored with a view to examining how state and non-state forms of trans-
national repression can, under some conditions, result in the dynamics of competitive 
authoritarianism within a diaspora. In such cases, ‘ordinary’ members of the diaspora 
may become caught between multiple forms of transnational repression in addition to 
potentially experiencing marginalization and securitization in their new home. 
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Can diaspora politics be authoritarian? Some, like Betts and Jones (2016), see diaspora 
politics as a form of transnationalism that can potentially challenge authoritarian 
regimes. Especially in the wake of the Arab uprisings of 2011, increased attention has 
been paid to the roles that citizens abroad can play in fostering political change at 
home. Since they are able to operate beyond the territorial limits of the state, diasporic 
opposition groups can arguably take advantage of their position as actors both ‘outside 
the nation-state’ and ‘inside the people’ (Shain and Barth 2003: 461). By using 
political resources and opportunities available in their host countries, diasporic 
opposition groups often show a potential to contribute to processes of democratization 
in their homelands. 
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At first glance, then, diaspora politics appears to be anything but authoritarian. The 
‘diaspora’ is regularly celebrated as a space of freedom from state control, in which 
grassroots organizing and bottom-up social movements can emerge to challenge 
repressive regimes in the home state. However, this view downplays the extent to 
which diaspora politics can become oppressive and contain elements of transnational 
repression.1 Indeed, non-state groups may employ illiberal, anti-democratic or authori-
tarian practices as part of their overall political strategy. Sometimes this emerges from 
constraints imposed on the diasporic actors’ structural positions. In other cases, it may 
be due to ideological reasons or to the preferences or leadership styles of diasporic and 
organizational elites. Just as different states have different regime types, so too does 
diaspora politics vary across the political spectrum. Diaspora politics is therefore not 
just a form of transnationalism that interacts with or contests state power; it also 
encompasses modalities of political control. 
In this article, I examine the use of authoritarian strategies and transnational rep-
ression by non-state actors engaged in diaspora mobilization and compare it with 
strategies employed by the state. Non-state actors engaged in diaspora politics at times 
use the same authoritarian policies and transnational repressive measures as some 
states – including extreme ones such as assassinations, intimidation and threats. More-
over, everyday features of authoritarianism, such as pressures for internal ideological 
conformity, top-down forms of political control, demands for unwavering loyalty to 
political elites, lack of transparency and accountability, and personality cults have all 
at times been found in various diasporic non-state opposition movements. State and 
non-state actors alike can use authoritarian strategies to mobilize and consolidate 
power in the diaspora, discourage internal opposition, and weaken or eliminate politi-
cal rivals. A focus on non-state authoritarianism can thus expand our understanding of 
the repertoires and strategies that political entrepreneurs use to mobilize the diaspora, 
as well as shed light on forms of authoritarianism beyond the territorial state. 
Ultimately, it also points to some of the spatial complexities of the liberal international 
order, in which liberal and illiberal spaces overlap and become intertwined in ways 
that create policy conundrums that transcend state boundaries. 
The rest of the article proceeds as follows. First, I provide a brief review of the 
literature on diaspora politics and how it intersects with debates on authoritarianism. 
Second, I discuss the concept of non-state authoritarianism as a form of transnational 
repression. In so doing, I point to a range of authoritarian practices used by states and 
look at the extent to which they have also been used by transnational and non-state 
actors. Third, I provide examples of non-state organizations and movements that have 
used these practices and suggest that competing forms of state- and non-state authori-
tarianism characterize some political behaviour in the diaspora. I conclude by discuss-
ing the implications for research and policy. 
Diaspora politics and authoritarianism 
Political science, sociology and migration studies all have growing literatures on 
diaspora politics (Adamson 2016; Adamson and Demetriou 2007; Brinkerhoff 2009; 
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Cohen 2008; Koinova 2010, 2012; Østergaard-Nielsen 2001; Ragazzi 2009; Shain 
2007; Shain and Barth 2003; Sheffer 2003, 2006). Until recently, however, this 
literature has had little to say about authoritarianism and transnational repression, aside 
from noting that diasporas often engage in political activities that can challenge certain 
aspects of authoritarian regimes. By drawing on existing national and transnational 
political opportunity structures, diasporic groups can use various forms of trans-
national mobilization to transform and reshape the homeland (Adamson 2002; 
Wayland 2004). This can include activities such as sending remittances (Brinkerhoff 
2008; Kapur 2010; Levitt 1998; Levitt and Lamba-Nieves 2011; Nyberg-Sørensen et 
al. 2003), protesting or engaging in symbolic politics, lobbying for changes in foreign 
policy towards the homeland (Hägel and Peretz 2005; Saideman 2001), agitating for 
political reform, or, in extreme cases, pursuing change via armed conflict and violence 
(Adamson 2013; Kaldor 2013; Van Hear and Cohen 2017). 
The interventions of external diasporic organizations have also been shown, in 
some cases, to improve the quality of governance in home states. Brinkerhoff (2005), 
for example, argued that, by using the internet to foster greater transparency, Coptic 
organizations in the United States helped to support more democratic forms of govern-
ance in Egypt. Other studies suggest that diasporic remittances can place pressure on 
authoritarian regimes by making populations less dependent on the state (Escribà-
Folch et al. 2015). More generally, diasporas have been viewed as actors that can, 
under certain conditions, promote democratization through the diffusion of liberal and 
democratic norms (Koinova 2009; Shain 1999). Betts and Jones (2016) have perhaps 
taken the argument the furthest. Drawing on examples from Rwanda and Zimbabwe, 
they suggest that diasporas in general, and refugee diasporas in particular, should be 
understood as key players in targeting and challenging authoritarian regimes at home. 
Such arguments often hold to the view that diasporic groups can influence authori-
tarian states from the outside inwards. Yet, a growing literature is focusing more on 
the opposite dynamic – how homeland states influence and shape diaspora politics 
from the inside outwards. This literature challenges the notion that diasporas are 
autonomous actors operating in transnational spaces removed from the interests and 
policies of their states of origin. Rather, states are increasingly reaching out to and 
shaping politics in the diaspora through their so-called ‘diaspora management policies’ 
(Adamson 2019; Collyer 2013; Délano and Gamlen 2014; Fitzgerald 2006a; Gamlen 
2008; Levitt and de la Dehesa 2003; Naujoks 2013; Varadarajan 2010). These include 
diaspora engagement, diaspora integration and diaspora-building policies which can 
vary depending on where the diasporas are located and the political interests of the 
sending state (Gamlen 2014; Mylonas 2013; Tsourapas 2015). These policies can 
range from giving members of the diaspora VIP status, encouraging remittances and 
investment, promoting dual citizenship and overseas voting, to using diasporic groups 
as a tool of public diplomacy to promote state interests abroad (Adamson and 
Demetriou 2007; Bauböck 2005; Collyer 2014; Fitzgerald 2006b; Lafleur 2011). 
Some scholars regard state programmes for the diaspora as a benign form of 
‘migration governance’ in which states respond to norms promoted by international 
organizations and design diasporic engagement policies for the purposes of facilitating 
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more efficient and stable migration management and economic development (Gamlen 
2014). Yet others note that states engage with ‘their’ diasporas for different reasons, 
and thus produce different types of engagement policies ranging from a focus on 
harnessing remittances, building ‘global nations’, enhancing a state’s soft power and 
ability to engage in public diplomacy, to a focus on surveillance (Ragazzi 2014). For 
example, a state’s interest in promoting a particular form of national identity abroad 
(Mügge 2012) may shape its ‘nation-building’ approaches to diaspora engagement. 
Transnational nation-building policies may rely on essentialized notions of who consti-
tutes the nation, thus activating the dynamics of transnational ‘re-ethnicization’ 
(Joppke 2003) in which states seek to enhance their power by extending their trans-
national constituencies through diaspora-building processes (Abramson 2017). 
Indeed, a state’s regime type is important for understanding variations in types of 
state–diaspora relations. Apart from structuring diaspora political engagement vis-à-
vis the homeland (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003; Shain and Barth 2003), the regime type 
determines the nature of the diaspora’s role in a state’s bilateral relations. In fact, 
diasporas are likely to play a positive part in forging bilateral relations in democratic 
dyads, that is when the country of origin and the country of residence are both demo-
cratic, but are sidelined in other dyadic formations, as in authoritarian–authoritarian or 
democratic–authoritarian dyads (Mirilovic 2016). Semi-authoritarian states may also 
use their emigrants to achieve foreign policy goals or national prestige, or as a way of 
projecting state power and gaining regional advantage (Tsourapas 2016). Moreover, 
different regime types may promote similar policies, albeit for different reasons. For 
example, whereas stable democracies may promote voting abroad as a way of expand-
ing democratic participation, authoritarian states may promote it for reasons that have 
more to do with controlling emigrants, using the process to register and monitor its 
overseas citizens (Brand 2010). 
Transnational repression and non-state authoritarianism 
That some forms of state diaspora engagement policies are geared toward the surveil-
lance and monitoring of their citizens abroad suggests that the relationship between 
diaspora politics and authoritarianism is more complex than some of the literature 
suggests. The location of diasporic spaces outside the physical boundaries of the state 
does not necessarily remove them from the pressures and effects of state authoritarian-
ism. Rather, state repressive power can extend into the spaces of other states and take 
the form of ‘transnational’ or ‘extraterritorial’ repression, acting as a ‘long-distance’ 
deterrent to political organizing and posing a threat to populations living abroad 
(Cooley and Heathershaw 2017: 187–219; Lewis 2015; Moss 2016). 
The use of authoritarian strategies to target political exiles and activists in the dias-
pora can extend into the space of liberal democratic states (Garvey 1980). Diasporic 
populations who live in liberal democracies face fewer restrictions on their political 
activities than those living in authoritarian states, where they may lack the basic rights 
to organize, assemble or protest. Moreover, authoritarian states often manage dissent 
by collaborating and sharing information with other such states (Cooley and 
Non-state authoritarianism and diaspora politics 
 5 
Heathershaw 2017: 194). This suggests that ‘separate institutions, especially those 
with a security function, are more likely to be established among communities from 
authoritarian states but resident in more politically open systems’ (Brand 2006: 218). 
Authoritarian and quasi-authoritarian regimes employ a range of tools to penetrate 
liberal democratic states. They may use consulates, embassies and other government 
actors to gather intelligence on citizens abroad; they can apply diplomatic pressure to 
encourage states to ban or close organizations or media outlets, label certain organiz-
ations as terrorist, and have individuals deported (Miller 1981: 30ff). They can also 
instruct bodies like Interpol to pursue dissidents and opposition figures in the diaspora 
by accusing them of economic or other crimes (Cooley and Heathershaw 2017: 194). 
Transnational or extraterritorial repression can also take more direct forms. Moss 
(2016: 485) presents a typology of strategies of transnational repression that states use 
to intimidate and deter opposition groups in the diaspora. These include lethal retri-
bution (actual or attempted assassinations); threats (verbal or written warnings); 
surveillance (gathering and sending information to central authorities); exile (banish-
ment from the country/polity); withdrawing scholarships or other forms of financial 
assistance; and proxy punishment (harassment of or harm to relatives in the home 
country). Indeed, a wide range of authoritarian and quasi-authoritarian states regularly 
use these strategies.2 
Yet, such strategies are not necessarily limited to states. Non-state actors may also 
use them in some cases to intimidate members of the diaspora as part of their strategies 
of political mobilization. Indeed, there is evidence to suggest that diaspora mobiliz-
ation by non-state actors can potentially contain a wide range of authoritarian 
elements. In addition to the strategies of transnational repression listed above, these 
include the use of personalistic forms of authority and personality cults; centralized 
power combined with political exclusion and internal repression; the use of propa-
ganda and coercion to enforce loyalty and ideological hegemony; militarism; mass 
mobilization; forcible extraction of resources; hierarchical and secretive organizational 
networks; patronage and patrimonialism; and hegemonic single party apparatuses that 
penetrate society and civic life. These strategies are not meant to constitute an 
exhaustive list, but they are indicative of aspects of authoritarianism that are found in 
a number of non-state organizations that have a strong diasporic presence. 
In many respects, one would expect certain subsets of non-state actors to have 
authoritarian proclivities that extend into their relations with the diasporic populations 
they seek to mobilize. National liberation movements, separatist organizations, rebel 
groups or other bodies that have used violence in the homeland and have a political 
presence in the diaspora are prime candidates for the use of techniques of political 
mobilization that, at least in part, rely on authoritarian ideologies, strategies and tactics. 
Some non-state organizations involved in diaspora mobilization resemble de-
territorialized quasi states as much as they do social movements; they seek to emulate 
states and ultimately achieve statehood, so have their own governments-in-exile, 
diplomatic strategies, welfare organizations and armed wings.3 Furthermore, such 
organizations need constantly to mobilize a constituency because they face compe-
tition from other political actors; the loyalty of their constituency cannot necessarily 
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be guaranteed via formal forms of membership, such as citizenship, and this may also 
provide incentives to turn to more authoritarian forms of securing and maintaining 
political support. 
Diaspora politics are often analysed as forms of transnationalism that operate 
according to a logic that differs from that used by state governments. Their study is 
heavily influenced by writings on transnationalism and social movements, with a focus 
on mechanisms such as framing, resource mobilization, coalition-building and 
brokerage (Adamson 2002; Wayland 2004). Situating diaspora politics within the 
broader literature on transnationalism and transnational politics has created a bias in 
much of the field towards understanding it in terms of progressive, liberal or cosmo-
politan forces operating as part of a broader global civil society, and ignoring the extent 
to which it can also encompass illiberal and repressive forms of transnationalism 
(Adamson 2005b; Bob 2005, 2012).4 
The extent to which any particular instance of diaspora politics operates according 
to liberal or other logics should be an empirical question open to investigation rather 
than a theoretical starting point. Just as different regime types approach diaspora 
politics in different ways, so too is there a variation in how different non-state actors 
approach diaspora mobilization and engagement. The idea that diaspora politics is 
antithetical to authoritarianism relies heavily on a statist paradigm that primarily 
locates authoritarianism within states and their regimes (Glasius 2018a, 2018b). Some 
forms of diaspora politics may simultaneously be about contesting an authoritarian 
regime abroad and exercising internal control and hegemony within the diaspora. The 
globalization of authoritarianism can carry over into the diaspora and potentially also 
include the tactics of opposition groups, resulting in the emergence of competing 
authoritarianisms in the diaspora. Ordinary people living in the diaspora may therefore 
in some cases be subject to intimidation, threats and forms of transnational repression 
from both state and non-state actors – in addition to possibly being marginalized as 
migrants, minorities or refugees in their states of residence. 
Analysing non-state authoritarianism: data, methods and approach 
Authoritarian states receive a great deal of attention in both the scholarly and policy 
literature, with datasets that provide indicators and that attempt to codify and classify 
states according to regime type.5 Furthermore, human rights organizations have long 
focused on human rights abuses and restrictions of civil and political rights in authori-
tarian states. Several scholars have noted, however, that most of the literature on 
authoritarianism adopts a rather circumscribed, territorial understanding of the state; it 
tends to focus on authoritarianism as it is manifested within the boundaries of states 
and leaves an ‘“extraterritorial gap”: an inability to perceive and analyse extraterri-
torial state power in general, and extraterritorial authoritarian power in particular’ 
(Dalmasso et al. 2018: 95). Yet, by conceptualizing authoritarianism not simply as a 
regime ‘type’, but rather ‘as a mode of governing people through a distinct set of 
practices’, we are able to gain insight into the transnational dimensions of authori-
tarianism. The transnational practices of authoritarian states beyond their territorial 
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borders ‘resembles but differs from authoritarian governance within territorial borders, 
constraining certain traditional ways of controlling populations (i.e. imprisonment or 
censorship) but enabling functional equivalents as well as new modes of control’ 
(Dalmasso et al. 2018: 97; Glasius 2018b: 519, 523). 
Conducting research in authoritarian settings presents numerous challenges 
(Glasius et al. 2018), as does researching transnational dynamics and collecting data 
on clandestine and illicit non-state actors. Nevertheless, there are sufficient data 
available from a range of sources to provide examples of the dynamics of competitive 
authoritarianism in particular cases. Existing sources include secondary scholarship, 
as well as a mixture of primary sources such as human rights reports, journalistic 
accounts, press reports, government documents and grey literature. In the following 
section, I draw on these sources to provide examples of transnational repression in the 
diasporic politics associated with the states of Turkey and Sri Lanka. The two cases 
share a number of similarities. Both countries have large, politically engaged diasporas 
abroad, and both have had brutal civil wars in which armed separatist non-state actors 
have relied on policies of ‘diaspora engagement’. The two cases are exploratory and 
use existing data in a theory-building inductive approach; the aim is not to document 
every instance of transnational repression but rather to engage in an exercise of 
grounded theory to flesh out our understanding of how, why and which actors use 
transnational repression.6 In these two cases, there is significant evidence that both 
state and non-state actors use forms of long-distance repression vis-à-vis ‘their’ 
diaspora populations, resulting in a form of long-distance ‘competitive authoritarian-
ism’ (Levitsky and Way 2010). 
State and non-state transnational repression: the Turkish case 
The political mobilization of Turks and Kurds living in Europe provides illustrative 
evidence of the various forms of transnational repression that both state and non-state 
actors use. In the case of Turkey, a variety of political actors, including the Turkish 
state, far-right nationalist organizations, Kurdish groups, religiously-defined groups 
such as Alevi, Yazidi and dissident Islamist movements all compete for support. 
Østergaard-Nielsen (2003: 107) noted that the political activities of emigrants ‘may 
be perceived as a threat when dissidence unfolds on the political stage of their receiv-
ing countries, outside the reach of the homeland state. The relationship between the 
Turkish State (and government) and its citizens and former citizens amply illustrates 
this ambiguity.’ The Turkish state has a history of using various forms of state control 
to monitor, shape and deter the political activities of Turks and Kurds in Europe and 
has for many years engaged in the surveillance and ‘long-distance policing’ of politi-
cal activists in Germany, France and elsewhere. Turks and Kurds in some instances 
have returned to Turkey only to find themselves held for questioning or, in some 
cases, arrested. Another technique the Turkish state has used is to cancel or refuse to 
renew the passports of Turkish and Kurdish political activists living abroad, thus 
compelling them either to return to Turkey, live abroad illegally, or apply for asylum. 
The Turkish state has also historically used this technique – called ‘passport 
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harassment’ – on union leaders and individuals who refuse to complete their obligatory 
military service. In addition, as Ostergaard-Nielsen (2003: 118–19) pointed out, 
Turkish embassies and consulates have tried to influence activities sponsored by 
Turkish and Kurdish organizations in Germany and to use teachers to gather infor-
mation on local community organizations. 
The Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which has been involved in armed conflict 
with the Turkish state since 1984, has been the main target of Turkish state activities, 
though the state has also targeted other leftist organizations, dissident Islamist groups 
and, more recently, members of the broader Hizmet (‘Service’) movement linked to 
Fethullah Gülen. Germany banned the PKK in 1993 and, under pressure from the Turk-
ish state, other PKK-related organizations and media groups operating abroad were 
also banned during the 1990s, including MED-TV, Firat News Agency in the 
Netherlands; ROJ-Groupa and Denge Mezopotamya Radio in Belgium; ROJ TV and 
MMC TV in Denmark; Newroz TV in Norway; the House of Kurdish People in Mar-
seille, France; and the newspaper Yeni Özgur Politika in Germany (Baser 2015: 77; 
Eccarius-Kelly 2008; Hassanpour 1998; Karagoz 2017: 89; Romano 2006: 153–9). 
There have also been several assassinations of PKK supporters in Europe, with the 
Turkish Intelligence Service (MİT) or organizations close to the state widely suspected 
of carrying them out. The most notable of these was in 2013, when Sakine Cansiz, one 
of the co-founders of the PKK, was executed in the Kurdistan Information Centre in 
Paris along with two other women, Fidan Doğan and Leyla Söylemez. More recently, 
in 2016, an assassination plot was uncovered that allegedly involved the Turkish 
Intelligence Service targeting the leaders of two Kurdish organizations. German police 
detained a suspected MİT agent in Hamburg in connection with this in December 2016 
(Yaș 2017). 
However, the Turkish state has used less obvious sources of control, some of which 
emerged historically out of agreements between Turkey and Western European states 
over migration recruitment in the 1960s–80s. These included expanding the role of the 
Turkish Ministry of Religious Affairs (Diyanet) in the diaspora; sending Turkish 
schoolteachers and other officials to Germany and other European states; increasing 
the activities of embassies, consulates and the MİT; and using diplomatic pressure 
(Østergaard-Nielsen 2003: 107). In the 1990s, for example, there were at least 470 
Turkish teachers in Germany sent by the Turkish Ministry of Education to teach the 
Turkish language and history, as well as Diyanet imams who serviced approximately 
775 mosques throughout Germany. The situation has changed little since then, with 
accusations made in April 2017 that Turkey was using imams in the Diyanet-linked 
Türkisch-Islamischen Union (DİTİB) to spy on Turkish communities abroad.7 
Since the attempted military coup of 15 July 2016, the Turkish government has 
accelerated its attempts to pursue activists in the diaspora. Kurdish individuals and 
organizations are still a main target, but a second one now includes individuals and 
organizations connected with the Hizmet movement associated with Fethullah Gülen, 
a cleric residing in Pennsylvania, USA, whom Turkish President Recep Tayyip 
Erdoğan has accused of being behind the coup attempt. In addition to asking the United 
States government to extradite Gülen, Turkey has tried to persuade numerous states to 
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close Gülen schools and organizations, and its intelligence agencies have been 
involved in keeping track of activists abroad and putting pressure on governments to 
pursue members of Hizmet within their own borders (Schenkkan 2018). 
Kurdish and German media outlets also reported that the Turkish government had 
given the German authorities lists of people under surveillance in February and March 
2017 and that these included members of Gülen-related organizations and Kurdish 
activists and leftists, such as members of the Revolutionary People’s Liberation 
Party/Front (DHKP-C) and the Marxist-Leninist Communist Party of Turkey (TKPM-
L). One list, under the heading of ‘the Fethullah Gülen Terrorist Organization/Parallel 
State Organization (FETÖ/PDY) in the Federal Republic of Germany’, apparently 
included approximately 300 names of people who were close to the Gülen-inspired 
Hizmet movement. The German police immediately notified everyone on the list and 
advised them not to travel to Turkey or to visit any Turkish consulates.8 
The PKK – both target and perpetuator of transnational repression 
The Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) has undoubtedly been a target of transnational 
repression by the Turkish state, and the violent conflict between the two entities has 
extended into the diaspora. The PKK has also at various points in its history resorted 
to authoritarian strategies and exercised transnational repression in the diaspora. This 
has changed over time, especially in relation to levels of repression in Turkey; for 
example, during the 2013–15 peace process, the PKK shifted its strategy in the 
diaspora in an attempt to ‘normalize’ and reach out to public officials. Furthermore, 
since 2011, the conflict in Syria, the fight between PKK-linked factions and ISIL, and 
the extension of the PKK into northern Syria, including the setting up of the quasi-
state of Rojava, have also changed the dynamics in the diaspora and given more 
legitimacy to Syrian-based organizations affiliated with the PKK. There has also been 
a shift in ideological orientation in the PKK towards principles of ‘democratic 
consociationalism’.9 
Nevertheless, at some points the PKK, like the Turkish state, has used violence and 
intimidation against rival organizations in the diaspora, including against the more 
moderate social democratic KOMKAR group, which it saw as a competitor. In fact, it 
assassinated Kurdish members of KOMKAR in Sweden in the 1980s and in Germany 
in the 1990s (Adamson 2013: 80; Baser 2015: 136). In the diaspora, the PKK sought 
to dominate large areas of civic life and to assert hegemony over local and cultural 
institutions. For example, in London it managed to dominate several local Kurdish 
institutions, which more apolitical Kurds had previously run. The PKK periodically 
used intimidation and threats to secure the support of the community. For example, 
Sözer and Yilmaz (2016: 8) recounted one restaurant owner saying that,  
They [the PKK] wanted to take my son to the Iraqi mountains. I strongly 
opposed the idea. As a result, one day the PKK raided my restaurants and beat 
both my employees and me … my sister was not as lucky as I was. The PKK 
took her son to the mountains, and he was killed in an armed conflict. 
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There are also reports of the PKK setting fire to restaurants in London. One individual 
related that, after refusing to pay money to the PKK, ‘they beat me right in front of my 
employees. They broke four of my bones. After all that, I did not give a dime and 
instead I moved my factory to another European country’ (Sözer and Yilmaz 2016: 8). 
Many in the community were especially vulnerable because they had refugee or ques-
tionable status or were working illegally in the UK, and thus were hesitant to go to the 
authorities with their concerns. In Germany, it has been estimated that almost 70 per 
cent of all incidents of extortion that took place in the 1990s were connected with the 
PKK. In the Netherlands, extortion was used regularly against Kurdish-owned pizza 
parlours (Adamson 2013). There are also reports of the PKK using the legal system in 
Britain to exercise control over the local community, by finding ways to sue local 
businesses for legal infractions if they failed to give enough money to the organization 
(Sözer and Yilmaz 2016). 
Another way of putting pressure on the local community was via trade in illicit 
substances. In London, the PKK managed to gain hegemony over the local drugs trade 
and a symbiotic relationship formed between it and local gangs (Sözer and Yilmaz 
2016). These dynamics meant that the Kurdish community in London was at times 
caught between the PKK and the local police and British intelligence services, whose 
activities were shaped in part by Britain’s relationship with Turkey or wider forces 
such as the global war on terror. Similar situations were experienced in other European 
states. Kurds were told that they could engage with the local Kurdish community, but 
not the PKK. In effect, however, the PKK had gained a strong degree of hegemony 
over the community and it became difficult for people to disentangle themselves from 
some of its activities (Sentas 2016). 
More broadly, despite its ideology having changed over time, the level of centraliz-
ation in the PKK has at times resembled a form of transnational authoritarianism. It 
was at its most extreme in the 1980s and 1990s, but the PKK is still centrally organized 
and symbolically allied to its imprisoned leader, Abdullah Öcalan, who remains the 
primary figurehead for the PKK-centred Kurdish movement. Some have argued that 
the PKK ‘consciously fosters a Stalin-like personality cult around its leader’ (White 
2000: 136). Indeed, Öcalan’s role in the Kurdish movement is so great that some 
people speak of the Apocular diaspora (White 2015: 3).10 While the PKK has changed 
its ideology over time – it has been Marxist-Leninist and separatist; it has focused on 
human rights and cultural autonomy; and it has espoused localism and democratic 
confederalism – the focus on Öcalan has remained constant. 
State and non-state transnational repression: the Sri Lankan case 
Sri Lanka offers another example of politics in the diaspora characterized by state and 
non-state transnational repression. Its government, like Turkey’s, fought a civil war 
with an armed separatist organization, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). 
Although the conflict ended with the LTTE’s military defeat in 2009, the relationship 
between Sri Lanka and ‘its’ diaspora continues to be heavily securitized, even in the 
post-conflict period.11 As Guyot (2017: 4) notes, ‘after its victory, the Sri Lankan 
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regime identified the diaspora as the new existential threat the country faced.’ Indeed, 
the Sri Lankan defence minister vowed to seize international assets belonging to the 
Tamil Tigers and to ‘eradicate the LTTE from the entire world’ (Sentas 2012: 97). 
According to reports, the Sri Lankan government has engaged in the direct 
surveillance of its diaspora abroad. Tamils in the United Kingdom and elsewhere have 
been subjected to the same kind of surveillance as those in the predominantly Tamil 
areas of Sri Lanka. People have been presented with photographs of themselves or of 
members of their family taken by the Sri Lankan security forces at Tamil protests or 
commemorative gatherings in the diaspora, and some UK Tamil organizations have 
reacted to this by banning cameras at events to ensure the safety of participants.12 
Others have noted that the Sri Lankan authorities ‘take a strong interest in the activities 
of the Tamil diaspora in the UK and many returning to Sri Lanka … have been tortured 
and interrogated about their activities and contacts in the UK’.13 Tamils abroad – even 
after 2009 – faced problems when they sought to return to Sri Lanka, which suggests 
that surveillance, intelligence gathering and intelligence sharing occurs in the 
diaspora.14 Additional reports claim that abductions in Sri Lanka target the families of 
diaspora activists, and that intermediaries based in the diaspora assist the Sri Lankan 
government in gathering relevant intelligence (TamilNet 2015). 
An additional means of exerting control over the diaspora has been through the use 
of proscription. Throughout the duration of the conflict, Sri Lanka put pressure on 
Western governments to ban the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). The UK 
designated it a terrorist organization in 2001 and forced it to shut down its London 
office; the European Union and Canada did so in 2006 (Nadarajah and Sriskandarajah 
2005; Orjuela 2011). Even after the armed conflict ended, the Sri Lankan state con-
tinued to accuse diasporic organizations of being terrorist groups and used this to 
justify maintaining domestic anti-terror laws in Sri Lanka (Guyot 2017: 4). As Sentas 
(2012: 111) put it, the use of proscription ‘facilitates a legal framework in which the 
counter-insurgency logic of the front is embedded in the criminal justice system trans-
nationally’. Sri Lankan foreign-service officers and anti-LTTE civil-society organiz-
ations in the diaspora, such as Sinhala nationalist groups (Orjuela 2008: 443), were 
among those lobbying for proscription. Sri Lankan officials were outspoken in urging 
governments in Europe and elsewhere to ban the LTTE, noting that ‘it is not something 
the Government of Sri Lanka can do on European soil, but must necessarily be initiated 
by the respective governments themselves’ (Aryasinha 2008: 28). By lobbying to 
brand the LTTE a ‘terrorist organization’, the Sri Lankan state triggered the appar-
atuses of the global war on terror, including national and international legislation, thus 
demonstrating the power that rests in the ability to deploy the language of terrorism 
(Nadarajah and Sriskandarajah 2005). 
The LTTE: both target and perpetrator of transnational repression 
The Sri Lankan state targeted the LTTE globally but the organization itself also at 
times wielded transnational repression within the diaspora. Like the PKK, the LTTE 
had a centralized structure and, by managing to capture and politicize civic life and 
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institutions, it exerted a great deal of control in the diaspora (Fair 2005; Orjuela 2008: 
441). It used authoritarian-like strategies to secure internal hegemony and to marginal-
ize rival Tamil groups, such as the Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization (TELO), the 
People’s Liberation Organization of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE) or the Eelam People’s 
Democratic Party (EPDF) (Gazagne and Sanchez-Cacidedo 2015: 4; McDowell 2005). 
The LTTE’s organizational structure placed the political wing of the organization 
below its military wing and there was a significant personality cult around its leader 
Velupillai Prabhakaran, who was killed in 2009. While many Tamils hailed him as a 
hero, Prabhakaran’s critics described him as ‘a street thug with a background 
specializing in extortion and smuggling who developed political ambitions in the early 
1970s’ (Thompson 2008, cited in Orjuela 2011: 123). 
At the height of the conflict in Sri Lanka, the LTTE kept a computer database and 
used information from its supporters to keep track of and closely follow the movements 
of individuals in the diaspora (Becker 2006: 12). At the time, Human Rights Watch 
recorded that ‘Tamils in the West have been subject to death threats, beatings, property 
damage, smear campaigns, fabricated criminal charges, and even murder as a conse-
quence of dissent’ (Becker 2006: 1). For example, in 2005 several German Tamils 
were threatened, attacked and severely beaten after organizing an event in honour of a 
Tamil whom the LTTE had allegedly assassinated in Sri Lanka. In another prominent 
case, assailants beat a Tamil journalist with baseball bats in Toronto for having written 
articles that were critical of the LTTE. There has also been at least one assassination 
in the diaspora; Sabaratnam Sabalingam, who was on the verge of publishing an anti-
LTTE book, was killed in Paris in 1994. In addition, prominent Tamils in Australia 
and London received death threats in 2005. Although the number of overtly violent 
incidents has been relatively low, they nonetheless create a climate of uncertainty, 
intimidation and fear in the diaspora (Becker 2006: 14–20, 33) Thus, Tamils in the 
diaspora suffered from transnational repression not only from a state but also from a 
non-state entity with a global reach. As one Tamil community activist in Toronto 
explained (Becker 2006: 1). 
Ninety per cent of people, even if they don’t support the LTTE, they are scared. 
The killing doesn’t just happen back home in Sri Lanka. It happens in Paris, in 
Canada. They burned the library, they broke the legs of DBS Jeyaraj. They tried 
to stop the CTBC radio from organizing. A journalist was killed in Paris. The 
threat is not only in Sri Lanka. It’s everywhere, all over the world.  
According to Human Rights Watch (Becker 2006), the LTTE sometimes used 
threats to family members and relatives as a means of controlling the diaspora. 
Numerous cases have been documented of individuals speaking out in the diaspora, 
only to have their family in Sri Lanka suffer harassment and intimidation (Becker 
2006: 19–20). Like the PKK, the LTTE attempted to exercise hegemony in the 
diaspora by controlling a range of civic organizations, including NGOs and Hindu 
temples. Its attempts to control religious institutions abroad bear some resemblance to 
the Turkish state’s use of the Diyanet to control mosques in its diaspora – although the 
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LTTE’s primary aim was to use temples as fundraising sites. As Orjuela (2011: 131) 
notes, ‘it was an open secret that the LTTE was behind the greater part of Tamil 
organizations and activities in the diaspora, while political initiatives taken outside of 
the control of the LTTE were opposed or silenced.’ In cities such as London, Toronto 
and Paris, ‘the LTTE and its supporters [took over and monopolized] social structures, 
from refugee relief in the 1980s to newspapers, shops and temples’ (Becker 2006: 14). 
In addition, the LTTE at times used extortionist tactics to force people in the 
diaspora to pay up to $2000 and businesses between $10,000 and $100,000 (Becker 
2006: 25ff). La (2004: 379) noted that it ‘developed a system to extract remittances in 
Canada by exploiting transnational social ties. They threaten migrants about the secur-
ity of relatives or property in Sri Lanka.’ There are also accounts of the LTTE in Sri 
Lanka forcing returnees or visitors from the diaspora to pay according to how much 
time they had spent in the West (for example, a dollar or pound a day) and, in a non-
state version of ‘passport harassment’, confiscating their passports and not allowing 
them to leave again until they had paid up (Becker 2006: 2). 
Diasporic LTTE politics and Tamil gang violence were implicated in at least 12 
deaths in London since 2000. A police operation in 2007 estimated that Tamil gangs 
engaging in extortionist practices against local businesses accounted for £70 million 
worth of credit card fraud. Similar patterns in Toronto, Paris and Oslo showed that 
there was an ‘overlap between the techniques used by the Tigers in Sri Lanka and the 
gangs’ (Orjuela 2011: 130). Because many people in the Tamil community are 
marginalized, or fear for their legal status, such activity often took place unnoticed and 
its effects were largely felt within the Tamil diaspora itself. Thus, the Tamil diaspora 
came under pressure from both the LTTE activities and the lobbying of the Sri Lankan 
state, which at times resulted in a criminalization of the entire Tamil community (Brun 
and Van Hear 2012; Nadarajah and Sriskandarajah 2005; Orjuela 2011; Sentas 2012). 
Conclusion 
I have argued that diaspora engagement by both state and non-state actors can be charac-
terized by long-distance authoritarianism and transnational repression. The brief case 
studies above suggest that non-state organizations are as capable as states of including 
transnational repression in their repertoires of diaspora engagement. Evidence from 
elsewhere (such as Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) mobilization in the diaspora during 
the Kosovo conflict), suggests that non-state actors can include long-distance authori-
tarianism among their ‘diaspora engagement’ strategies. This is especially likely among 
those involved in armed conflict in the homeland, which is hardly surprising given the 
propensity of such organizations to use violence and repression to achieve their aims. 
Nevertheless, it raises broader questions about the possibilities for other forms of 
‘diasporic authoritarianism’ to emerge from non-state actors operating transnationally. 
While the authoritarian practices of non-state organizations resemble the trans-
national authoritarian practices of states in some ways, they also differ in other 
respects. For example, non-state actors are unlikely to have the same resources and 
infrastructure as a state with which to monitor and repress populations. At the same 
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time, a number of non-state organizations with ‘diaspora engagement’ policies do 
mimic states in a number of respects. Armed groups that seek to establish a state of 
their own often have sophisticated structures of ‘rebel governance’ (Arjona 2016; 
Arjona et al. 2015; Mampilly 2011) that can be used to control populations at home 
and abroad. These include structures of diplomacy and welfare, as well as internal 
security apparatuses that can be utilized for the surveillance, repression and policing 
of ‘their’ diaspora populations. 
At the very least, raising the issue of non-state authoritarianism opens up a space 
for examining the complexity of intra-diasporic dynamics and the multiple ways in 
which diaspora politics can create a ‘globalization of domestic politics’, including a 
globalization of authoritarianism (Cooley and Heathershaw 2017; Koslowski 2006; 
Lyons and Mandaville 2010). Such an approach also has important policy implicat-
ions. It shows how global and local factors can become intertwined in particular 
contexts and the policy conundrums this creates at different levels – from the micro-
level of local policing, to the national level of managing bilateral relations, where such 
processes connect with broader global narratives around terrorism, conflict and 
transitional justice. Finally, the analysis points to the multiple stresses to which many 
‘ordinary’ members of diasporic populations may be subject, especially in cases where 
they are required to navigate their way through a complex combination of transnational 
repression from both state and non-state actors, as well as – in some cases – marginaliz-
ation and securitization in their adopted home. 
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Notes 
1. Moss (2016) introduced the concept of ‘transnational repression’. In this article, I build on 
her seminal work, as well as on that of Cooley and Heathershaw (2017), Glasius (2018a, 
2018b) and Lewis (2015). See also Garvey (1980) and Shain (1989). 
2. Such strategies are not limited to authoritarian states. In 2011, the United States killed three 
of its citizens with an extraterritorial drone, including Anwar al-Awlaki, a Muslim cleric and 
senior operative in al-Qaeda in Yemen who had been born in New Mexico and retained his 
US citizenship (Mazetti et al. 2013). Moreover, as Moss (2018) reminds us, much of the 
surveillance equipment that authoritarian states use to spy on their citizens in the diaspora 
originates from Western governments. 
3. See the literature on rebel governance (Arjona 2016; Arjona et al. 2015; Mampilly 2011; 
Staniland 2014), rebel diplomacy (Huang 2016) and governments-in-exile (Shain 1991, 2010). 
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04. Some of this literature focuses on how conflict actors deploy social-movement strategies 
(Adamson 2005a, 2013; Koinova 2013) and there is also a large body of work on diasporas 
as conflict-perpetuators and ‘peace-wreckers’ (Smith and Stares 2007). 
05. See, for example, the Polity IV Project: http://www.systemicpeace.org/polityproject.html as 
well as the extensive literature on authoritarianism in political science (Cheibub et al. 2010; 
Gasiorowski 1996; Geddes et al. 2014; Linz 2000). 
06. On grounded theory and inductive theory-building, see Glaser and Strauss (2017). 
07. The figures come from the Turkish Ministry of Education and Turkish Parliament (TBMM) 
as cited in Østergaard-Nielson (2003: 108). A more recent count of mosques engaging 
Diyanet imams is 800 (Zeit Online 2017a). 
08. See various Die Zeit articles, including (Zeit Online 2017a, 2017b, 2017c). See also Yaș 
(2017). Kurdish news sources claim that, unlike those on the Gülen-linked lists, the German 
authorities did not notify those on the Kurdish lists. 
09. See Biehl (2012) and Leezenberg (2016). 
10. Apo is Abdullah Öcalan’s nickname; the term Apocular is a Turkish construction meaning 
‘those who follow Apo’. 
11. The notion of who constitutes a ‘diaspora’ is always political and contested. Sinhalese and 
Tamils often do not consider themselves to be part of the same diaspora, just as Turks and 
Kurds may identify as being part of different diasporas. For a discussion on diasporas as 
social constructions, see Adamson (2012). For the role of sending state policies in generating 
multiple diasporas and shaping intra-diasporic politics, see Adamson (2019). I thank an 
anonymous reviewer for emphasizing this point. 
12. Asylum Research Centre (2016: 5) citing ITJP Sri Lanka (2015: 13, 92). 
13. Asylum Research Centre (2016: 6) citing Freedom from Torture (2015: 9). 
14. Various corroborations of these allegations exist, see for example Miller (2013). 
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